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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of freedom of speech in the United States has devel-
oped over the course of more than 200 years of jurisprudence, ex-
tending backto the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791. The first of
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these ten amendments prohibits Congress from "mak[ing any] law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."l
Despite the language of the First Amendment, the United States
Supreme Court has allowed some restrictions on speech, as demon-
strated by the "clear and present danger" test formulated in Schenck
v. United States.2 Yet, the notion of what represents a clear and pres-
ent danger has evolved over the past seventy-seven years, and the
kinds of restrictions permitted in Schenck under the Espionage Act of
1917 would not be allowed today under the prevailing, more liberal
interpretation of the First Amendment. Dennis v. United States,3
which applied the clear and present danger test, explained that "the
basis of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut
speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will
result in the wisest governmental policies."4 Freedom of speech is not
seen as a danger, but rather as a forum from which a superior notion
of the proper relationship between government and citizen will
emerge.
The tradition supporting freedom of speech is unique to the United
States. Each nation has developed its own definition of "free speech."
In contrast to the American concept of freedom of speech, the German
concept of freedom of speech developed from an entirely different his-
torical context. The modern German state arose from the ashes of
twelve years of totalitarian rule, marked by the greatest crimes
against humanity in the course of history. The new German republic
was determined to prevent the reoccurrence of Nazi crimes. The Ger-
man Federal Constitution, the Grundgesetz, allows the free establish-
ment of political parties; 5 however, it also permits the German
Federal Constitutional Court, the Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts, to declare certain political parties unconstitutional. 6
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
4. Id. at 502.
5. GRUNDGESEZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 21(1) (F.R.G.).
6. Id. art. 21(2). Article 21, Paragraph 2 of the German Constitution provides that
"Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to
impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of
the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. The Federal Constitu-
tional Court shall decide on the question of unconstitutionality." DAvm P. CuR-
aIE, THE CoNsTiTUTIoN OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 352
(1994)(translating the text of the German Constitution). The Federal Constitu-
tional Court has declared only two parties to be unconstitutional. In 1952, the
Court declared the new Nazi Socialist Reich Party unconstitutional. Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court]
[BVerfGE] 2 (1952), 1. In 1956, the German Communist Party was declared un-
constitutional. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Federal Consti-
tutional Court] [BVerfGE] 5 (1956), 85. See generally CuRma, supra, at 216-21.
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The German Constitution also prohibits organizations that are di-
rected against the constitutional order.7 The German government has
criminalized both the dissemination of propaganda by an organization
that has been declared unconstitutional and membership in such an
organization.8
The right to free political speech presents the German government
with something of a dilemma: on one hand, denying freedom of speech
to all political groups is a hallmark of totalitarian governments; on the
other, Germany certainly would face domestic and international out-
rage if it allowed Nazi-like groups to flourish on its territory. In strik-
ing this balance, the German state has subordinated the right to
complete freedom of speech to the desire to prevent the reestablish-
ment of a totalitarian state in Germany.9
The ban on parties or organizations that advocate a nondemocratic
government extends beyond membership and propaganda to include
the use of their symbols, flags, uniforms, and forms of address.1O Such
a ban is illustrative of the "zero-tolerance" approach of the German
government with respect to undemocratic parties. Laws that limit un-
constitutional parties and organizations effectively form a net that is
intended to prevent the possibility of the resurrection of Nazism and
the illegal state, or "Unrechtsstaat.11 Another part of the net in-
cludes prohibitions in the German Penal Code, the Strafgesetzbuch, on
crimes against public order. The German Penal Code devotes an en-
tire title to crimes that endanger the democratic legal state, including
membership in an unconstitutional organization, dissemination of
propaganda of an unconstitutional organization, and use of the sym-
bols of an unconstitutional organization.12 Taken together, German
legislation criminalizes nearly every public or private expression of
the trappings or ideology of the Nazi party.
7. Article 9(2) of the German Constitution provides that "[a]ssociations whose pur-
poses or activities conflict with criminal statutes or that are directed against the
constitutional order or the concept of international understanding are prohib-
ited." CumauE, supra note 6, at 346 (translating provisions of the German
Constitution).
8. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
9. For an in-depth discussion of the evolution and rationale of German free speech
rights, see David E. Weiss, Note, Striking a Difficult Balance: Combating the
Threat of Neo-Nazism in Germany While Preserving Individual Liberties, 27
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 899 (1994).
10. See infra note 48.
11. Literally translated, the term Unrechtsstaat means "illegal state." This term fre-
quently is contrasted to the Rechtsstaat, the current legitimate government in
Germany.
12. §§ 84-91 Nr. 1 StGB (author's translation of the German Penal Code). See also
infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
Gary Rex Lauck was born to American citizens of German descent
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1953. He became interested in Nazism as
a youngster, reading Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf at age thirteen.'3
This interest became an obsession, and in 1972, he founded the Na-
tional Socialist German Workers' Party-Foreign Organization
(NSDAP-AO)14 in Lincoln, Nebraska.'5
In 1974, the German Constitutional Court banned the NSDAP-AO
as an unconstitutional organization in Germany.16 Two years later,
Lauck was arrested in Germany for distributing Nazi propaganda and
was deported after spending four months in investigatory custody.17
This detention period failed to deter Lauck from pursuing his dream of
establishing a national socialist state in Germany. Lauck actively
promoted Nazi ideology worldwide through speeches and literature.
The NSDAP-AO was financed through the sale of Nazi literature and
memorabilia, such as uniforms and tapes of Hitler's speeches. In addi-
tion, the NSDAP-AO received donations from Nazi sympathizers in
South America and South Africa.'8 By the time of his arrest in 1995,
Lauck had become extremely influential among Nazi sympathizers.
According to the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution,
the Bundesamt fair Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Lauck was the biggest
supplier of neo-Nazi material to Germany. In 1995, the Simon
Wiesenthal Center named Lauck one of the most dangerous neo-Nazis
in the world.19
Lauck's importance to the cause of Nazism was not confined to
Germany. According to one former leader of the German neo-Nazi
movement, "[t]o say that the international neo-Nazi scene would col-
13. Gregory Katz, U.S. Nazi Facing German Judgment, DALLAS MoRNInG NEws,
Aug. 17, 1996, at 1A.
14. The term NSDAP-AO was adapted from the name of Adolf Hitler's party, Nation-
alsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, or the National Socialist German Work-
ers' Party.
15. Toni Heinzl, Nebraska Neo-Nazi Still Waiting for Trial in Germany, OMAHA
WoRLD HERALD, Jan. 21, 1996, at lB.
16. Such a finding is necessary for prosecution. §§ 86-86a Nr. 1 StGB. See infra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
17. Vier Jahre Freiheitsstrafe far Lauck [Four-Years Imprisonment for Lauck],
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEnqE, Aug. 23, 1996, at 4 [hereinafter Four-Years
Imprisonment].
18. INGO HASSELBACH, FOHRER-Ex 161 (1996).
19. Michaela Haas, Das Verfahren gegen den amerikanischen Neonazi Gary Lauck
Der Grosslieferant des rechten Wahns [Proceedings Against Gary Lauck, the Main
Supplier of Right-Wing Delusions], SIODDEUTSCHE ZErruNG, May 13, 1996, at 3.
The Simon Wiesenthal Center is a nonprofit organization with its headquarters
in Los Angeles, California. The Center is dedicated to disseminating information
that relates to the Holocaust.
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lapse without Lauck was an understatement."20 Approximately
20,000 copies of Lauck's publications appeared every two months, and
roughly 2000 to 3000 copies of the German language NS-Kampfru 2
were shipped to Germany.22 Besides German, NS-Kampfruf was
translated into English, French, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese,
Hungarian, Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian and was shipped to
more than thirty countries worldwide. 23
In addition to racist and anti-Semitic literature, NS-Kampfruf of-
fered for sale to readers such items as portraits of Adolf Hitler, copies
of Mein Kampf, and swastika stickers with expressions like "We're
back" and "Be right back." As will be discussed, all of these materials
are prohibited under various provisions of the German Penal Code.24
Their production and dissemination within the United States, how-
ever, is protected by the United States Constitution.
The NSDAP-AO acted as more than a supplier of literature and
paraphernalia. In addition to selling these propaganda materials,
Lauck's organization helped forge ties between the German neo-Nazi
movement and American hate groups, such as the Klu Klux Klan.25
The NSDAP-AO also acted as an information and intelligence ex-
change for neo-Nazi groups within Germany. Lauck kept close track
of right-wing extremist groups in Germany and facilitated communi-
cation between them.
Although Lauck distributed pro-Nazi material in many countries,
he focused his efforts on Germany. For him, Germany was the "holy
soil" from which national socialism had arisen.2 6 Lauck's goal was to
replace what he called the "treasonous Jew-filled Bonn government"2 7
with a national socialist state. NS-Kampfruf called for the establish-
ment of an underground cadre modeled on the Red Army Faction
(RAF).2s Lauck wanted to build a network throughout Germany of
20. HASSELBACH, supra note 18, at 161.
21. Literally translated, "NS-Kampfruf' means "National Socialist Battlecry." This
publication was modeled on Julius Streicher's Der Stfirmer, which was published
in Germany during the Nazi era. Streicher was a virulent anti-Semite who was
sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg.
22. Wolfgang Zehrt, Hitlers Stellvertreter [Hiter's Representative], StDDEUTSCHE
ZErruNG, Jan. 19, 1996, at 8.
23. Ddinemark will Neonazi Lauck ausliefern [Denmark Wants to Extradite Neo-Nazi
Lauck], Dm PRESE, May 10, 1995.
24. See infra section II.C.
25. See infra section I1.C.
26. HASSELBACH, supra note 18, at 161.
27. Id.
28. RAF was a Marxist-Leninist terrorist group founded by university students in
1970. RAF's general ideology was antiimperialist and anticapitalist. RAF mem-
bers initially robbed banks, and later began bombing attacks on North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) facilities and attacking German government offi-
cials. RAF members assassinated the German Chief Federal Prosecutor and the
President of the Employers Association in 1977, which marked the height of its
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cells of three to five members, which would be very difficult for the
police to infiltrate. 29 The cells were to execute individuals who needed
to be eliminated to establish a national socialist state in Germany.
Once this regime was in place, Lauck planned to return to Germany to
lead it. He could then fulfill his dream of having schoolchildren
taught his name.3 0 It was with these insane fantasies that Gary
Lauck wished to transform the course of German history through his
propaganda.
As a result of Lauck's activities and fantasies, German officials had
been trying to prosecute Lauck since his release from investigatory
custody in 1976. German officials had been unsuccessful, however,
primarily because Lauck's activities were carried out in the United
States and were protected there by the First Amendment. 3 1 Despite
numerous requests from German officials, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation had refused to search for neo-Nazi literature in Lauck's
home in Lincoln, Nebraska.32 But, when Lauck traveled to Denmark
to visit Danish neo-Nazis in 1995, he was arrested and extradited to
Germany. Thus, German officials had their chance to stop or greatly
reduce the flow of Nazi propaganda, at least in paper form, into their
country.
A. The Arrest
On March 23, 1995, German police raided eighty apartments in
fifteen of the sixteen German states as part of an operation code-
named Atlantik II, which directly targeted the NSDAP-AO. For more
than fourteen years, the BfV, as well as the German Federal Criminal
Police, the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA),33 had been investigating indi-
success. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, in 1987, RAF had approxi-
mately 20 "hardcore" members and a slightly larger number of "illegal militants"
to carry out less lethal attacks. Peripheral supporters also provided logistical
and financial support. See DiREcToRATE OF INTELLIGENCE, CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, WEST GERmANY's RED ARMY FACTION (1987); Hans Joseph
Harchem, The Terrorist Lobby in West Germany: Campaigns and Propaganda in
Support of Terrorism, in TOLERATING TERRORISM IN THE WEST 33-57 (Noemi Gal-
Or ed., 1991). According to the German Chief Federal Prosecutor, RAF had be-
come "virtually insignificant" by 1997, and had not carried out any murders since
1991. See Christian Mueller, Deutschlands Rote-Armee-Fraktion am Ende? [The
End of Germany's Red Army Faction], NEUE ZUmCHER ZErruNG, Feb. 5, 1997, at 5.
29. Michaela Haas & Stephan Lebert, Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland: Wie
gef)dhrlich ist die Szene noch? [Right-Wing Extremism in Germany: Is It Still
Dangerous?], SODDEUTSCHE ZErrUNG, Jan. 13, 1996, at 3.
30. Haas, supra note 19, at 3.
31. Heinzl, supra note 15.
32. Rick Atkinson, Germany Set to Try U.S. Supremacist, WASH. PosT, May 9, 1996,
at A36.
33. The Federal Criminal Police is the German equivalent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in America.
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viduals who ordered NSDAP-AO material.3 4 The goal of the operation
was the confiscation of NSDAP-AO propaganda. In addition to the
banned material, authorities arrested fifty-six people and seized
weapons and ammunition.35 All fifty-six individuals were suspected
of having received illegal material from the NSDAP-AO.36 Atlantik II
was timed to coincide with Gary Lauck's trip to Denmark for a meet-
ing with members of the Danish national socialist movement.3 7
In addition to Atlantik II, German officials had circulated an Inter-
national Criminal Police Organization, or Interpol,38 which is an in-
ternational arrest warrant,39 in fifteen European countries, including
Denmark.40 Authorities in Germany sought the Interpol warrant af-
ter Lauck called for the murder of a German government official in an
issue of NS-Kampfruf.41 An Interpol group consisting of German and
Danish police agents arrested Lauck in a Copenhagen suburb at the
home of the head of the Danish national socialist movement. Even
before Lauck's arrest and extradition, a BKA spokesperson called
Atlantik II a success because it had allowed authorities to decisively
disrupt one method of propaganda delivery to Nazi sympathizers.42
With Lauck's arrest, German officials believed that they had finally
captured the "puppet master" behind the NSDAP-AO.43 Neverthe-
34. Gemeinsame Aktion von Staatsanwaltschaft, Polizei und Verfassungsschutz
[Joint Action by the Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Police, and BM V, SUDDEUTSCHE
ZErrUNG, Mar. 24, 1995, at 2 [hereinafter Joint Action].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Zehrt, supra note 22, at 8.
38. Interpol's mission is to fight international crime, apprehend fugitives, and facili-
tate international police cooperation. Denmark, Germany, and the United
States, along with approximately 150 other nations are members of the France-
based organization. American participation in Interpol is coordinated through
the Department of Justice. Fourteen American agencies with police powers have
representatives at the National Central Bureau (NCB) in Washington, D.C. See
MICHAEL FOoNER, INTERPOL: ISSUES IN WORLD CRmin AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE (1989).
39. A so-called "red" notice must contain (1) information sufficient to identify the
wanted person, (2) a judicial warrant for the individual's arrest, (3) a statement
of the crime, and (4) a commitment that the requesting state will seek extradi-
tion. The country seeking arrest asks the Interpol General Secretariat to issue
such a red notice. If approved, it is then distributed to the NCB of the country or
countries in which the person sought may appear. It is within the discretion of
the requested country, however, to determine whether or not to arrest or detain a
person named in a red notice. See FOoNER, supra note 38, at 154. An Interpol red
notice is sufficient for arrest in most European civil law countries. See MALCoLMt
ANDERSON, POLICING THE WORTD: INTERPOL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
POLICE COOPERATION 188 (1989).
40. Denmark Seizes U.S. Nazi on German Bid, N.Y. TnuEs, Mar. 24, 1995, at AT.
41. Zehrt, supra note 22, at 8.
42. Joint Action, supra note 34, at 2.
43. Polizei durchsucht 80 Wohnungen [Police Search 80 Residences], FRANKFURTER
ALLGENEINE, Mar. 24, 1995, at 4.
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
less, even though Lauck was under arrest in Denmark, it remained to
be seen whether he would be extradited to Germany.
B. The Charges in Germany
The warrant for Lauck's arrest set forth five charges with a total of
thirty-six counts.44 The charges included (1) incitement of the peo-
ple;45 (2) incitement of racial hatred;46 (3) distribution of propaganda
of an unconstitutional organization; 47 (4) use of symbols of an uncon-
stitutional organization;48 and (5) membership in a criminal organiza-
tion.49 The German Penal Code classifies the first two charges as
offenses against public order, while the latter three fall under the cat-
egory of offenses endangering the democratic legal state.50
44. Heinzl, supra note 15.
45. Anyone who incites racial hatred against a segment of the population in a way
that disturbs the public peace can be punished by imprisonment of three months
to five years. § 130 Nr. 1 StGB (translated by authors). "Segment of the popula-
tion" has been defined broadly and has been read to include the following individ-
uals or groups: workers, farmers, civil servants, soldiers, judges, lawyers,
Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Freemasons, Bavarians, Swabians, and members of
a certain political group.
46. Anyone who "1) Disseminates; 2) Publicly displays, posts, presents or otherwise
makes available; 3) Makes available to a person under eighteen years of age; or 4)
Produces, obtains, delivers, holds, offers, advertises, or extols writings which...
incite people to racial hatred" will be punished by imprisonment for between
three months and five years. § 131 Nr. 1 StGB (translated by authors). "Writ-
ings" has been held to include audio tapes, photographs, and television broad-
casts. Section 131 is intended primarily to prevent incitement of racial hatred
against Jewish people.
47. The dissemination of propaganda of an organization declared unconstitutional by
the constitutional court is punishable by up to three years imprisonment. Three
years imprisonment is the maximum punishment for violation of this section.
Only those writings directed against the "democratic constitutional structure of
the Federal Republic" or against the "concept of international understanding" are
punished under this law. § 86 Nr. 1 StGB (translated by authors). "Writings"
has been very broadly interpreted. § 11 Nr. 3 StGB. The NSDAP-AO was de-
clared unconstitutional in 1974.
48. The German Penal Code covers a wide variety of symbols, including flags,
uniforms, and forms of greeting. Violation of this section is punishable by impris-
onment for six months to three years. See § 86a Nr. 2 StGB. The statute has
been interpreted very broadly. For example, it has been found to cover the sale of
model airplane kits containing the swastika decals necessary to make them his-
torically accurate.
49. Anyone who is a member of an unconstitutional organization or an organization
that takes the place of an organization previously found to be unconstitutional,
either openly or secretly, whether a rank and file member or a leader, can be
imprisoned for three months to five years. § 84 Nr. 2 StGB (translated by
authors).
50. §§ 84, 86, 86a, 130-131 Nr. 2 StGB (translated by authors).
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C. The Extradition
Gary Lauck had good reason to believe that he would not be ar-
rested in or extradited from Denmark. For years, Denmark had
served as a base from which neo-Nazis could carry out their activities
without fear of arrest.S1 Its liberal freedom of speech laws tolerated
all kinds of political discourse, including extolling the "glory" of Nazi
Germany.52 For example, during the 1980s, an ex-Auschwitz guard,
Thies Christopherson, shipped propaganda denying that the Holo-
caust happened to Germany from his adopted home in Denmark.5 3
Christopherson was able to do this despite the existence of a warrant
for his arrest in Germany. When he was arrested in 1988, Chris-
topherson successfully fought extradition on the basis of freedom of
speech principles.54
Denmark served as a transshipment point for large deliveries of
Lauck's material, as well as a place where neo-Nazi fugitives could
hide. In June 1994, the Danish Minister of Justice, Erling Olson, ex-
plained that Denmark's "extraordinarily tolerant" freedom of speech
laws5 5 made it impossible to arrest people like Christopherson. Yet,
Olson noted that Denmark had no intention of becoming a sanctuary
for German right-wing extremists.56 While Denmark took no immedi-
ate action to arrest or deport Christopherson, he shortly thereafter
sold his business and moved to Switzerland. 57 Olson's remarks may
have signified the beginning of a change in attitude on the part of
Danish officials, which Gary Lauck would have done well to heed. In a
departure from their prior policy, Danish authorities were going to
take a much closer look at the propaganda being sent through their
country.
On May 18, 1995, the Danish Ministry of Justice announced its
decision to extradite Lauck because his propaganda, specifically NS-
51. HASSELBACH, supra note 18, at 165.
52. Mary Williams Walsh, Neo-Nazi Tests Denmark's Defense of Free Speech, L.
Tzms, July 25, 1995, at 4.
53. Hubert Wetzel, Wegen der liberalen Gesetzlage fiir Neonazis war Ddinemark
bisher ein Eldorado [Denmark's Liberal Legal Standards Made It an Eldorado for
Neo-Nazisl, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Aug. 29, 1995.
54. Walsh, supra note 52, at 4.
55. "Any person shall be entitled to publish his thoughts in printing, in writing, and
in speech, provided that he may be held answerable in a court ofjustice. Censor-
ship and other preventative measures shall never again be introduced." GRUN-
DLOV [Constitution] part VIII, para. 77 (Den.), translated in CONSTrrUIONS OF
THE CotmuREs OF THE WORLD 23-24 (Gilbert H. Flanz et al. eds., Roxanne E.
Henry & Kenneth E. Miller trans., 1979).
56. BKA Chef Zachert trifft FBI-Vertreter [German Federal Criminal Police Chief
Zachert Meets Representative ofFBi], SODDETrrSCHE ZErruNG, June 30, 1994.
57. Walsh, supra note 52, at 4.
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Kampfruf, violated Danish antiracism law.5 8 As will be discussed
later, a finding of double criminality59 is an essential precursor to ex-
tradition under both customary international law and the European
Convention on Extradition (ECE).60 One part of the principle of
double criminality requires that Lauck's activities in Denmark consti-
tute a crime under Denmark's criminal laws. Thus, finding that
Lauck violated Danish antiracism laws was crucial to the Ministry's
decision to extradite Lauck.
Lauck did not accept the Ministry of Justice's ruling, however, and
appealed to the Roskilde District Court for a review of the Ministry's
decision.61 In his petition, Lauck argued that this decision was im-
proper because his literature did not violate Danish law and because
he faced harsher punishment in Germany than in Denmark.62 The
district court, however, rejected Lauck's argument and affirmed the
Ministry of Justice's extradition order on June 3, 1995. Lauck imme-
diately appealed this judgment, repeating his claim that his literature
did not violate Danish law. In his appeal, Lauck also argued that his
work was protected by American law and that Danish authorities
could not prosecute him in Denmark for acts that were legal in
America.63 The case went to the Eastern Court of Appeals, which an-
nounced its decision on June 23, 1995, and affirmed the decision of the
district court, agreeing that NS-Kampfruf violated the Danish antira-
cism law.6 4
Lauck again refused to accept the court's decision and appealed to
Denmark's highest court. On July 20, 1995, the Danish Supreme
Court agreed to hear Lauck's petition, and it announced its decision on
58. Ddinemark will Neonazi Gary Lauck ausliefern [Denmark Wants to Extradite
Gary Lauck], SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, May 8, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Denmark
Wants to Extradite].
59. See infra section MI.B for an explanation of the necessity of double criminality.
60. European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 3(2), 359 U.N.T.S. 173,
Europ. T.S. No. 24. See also infra section HI.B.
61. Like the American federal system, the Danish court system has three levels. The
district courts are trial courts offirst instance and hear the vast majority of crimi-
nal cases. The intermediate courts of appeal try a few serious criminal cases, but
act mostly in the appellate role. Most decisions of a district court can be appealed
to the appellate level, which either will rule on the proceedings and decision of
the district court or will evaluate both the district court's decision and the evi-
dence on the record. Final appeals are taken to the Danish Supreme Court,
which never acts as a court of first instance. Supreme Court decisions are made
only on rulings and not on evidence. See DANISH LAw: A GENERAL SURVEY 370-
71, 392-93 (Hans Gammeltoit-Hansen et al. eds., 1982).
62. Denmark Wants to Extradite, supra note 58, at 1.
63. Wirbel um Auslieferug eines Neonazis an Deutschland; Erster Gerichtsentscheid
in Ddinemark [Turmoil over Extradition of a Neo-Nazi to Germany; First Judicial
Decision in Denmark], NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG, June 7, 1995, at 2.
64. Obergericht: Neonazi Lauck kann ausgeliefert worden [Court of Appeals: Neo-
Nazi Lauck Can Be Extradited], SUDDEUTSCHE ZErrUNG, June 24, 1995, at 1.
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August 25, 1995. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts,
finding that Lauck's propaganda was punishable under Danish law as
racist agitation, and therefore concluding that Lauck could be extra-
dited to Germany.65 Even with a decision against him from Den-
mark's highest court, Lauck continued to resist his extradition by
immediately applying to the Danish Immigration Board for political
asylum. 66 This application was denied on September 1, 1995, and
Lauck was delivered to German authorities in Hamburg four days
later.67
D. Applicable Danish Law
The Danish Ministry of Justice and Danish courts based their deci-
sions to extradite Lauck on Article 266b of the Danish Penal Code,
which criminalizes racist statements. This is the only restriction on
freedom of expression in the Danish Criminal Code.68 Although Art-
cle 266b had not been vigorously enforced before Lauck's arrest, Den-
mark had amended its penal code to toughen its penalties while Lauck
awaited extradition. As amended, Article 266b calls for a maximum
two-year sentence for making racist statements. 69 The Danish
Supreme Court found that the remarks made in the Danish language
edition of NS-Kampfruf, such as "In my opinion, the Jews have been
treated too humanely. We must not make this mistake again," were
racist criminal statements punishable under Article 266b.70 After
convincing the courts that Lauck's materials violated Danish law, the
Ministry of Justice was free to extradite Lauck to Germany.
E. The Trial
After Lauck's petition for political asylum was denied, the last ob-
stacle to Lauck's extradition was removed. Lauck was extradited to
Hamburg on September 5, 1995, and was placed in investigatory cus-
tody. At that time, the Hamburg chief prosecutor estimated the inves-
tigation would last approximately three months.71 The charges were
65. Oberstes ddnisches Gericht: US-Neonazi Lauck wird an Deutschland ausgeliefert
[Supreme Court of Denmark: U.S. Neo-Nazi Lauck To Be Extradited to Ger-
many], SODDEUTSCHE ZErrUNG, Aug. 25, 1995, at 1.
66. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
67. Neo-Nazi Brought to Germany, JERUSALEM PoST, Sept. 8, 1995, at 8.
68. Walsh, supra note 52, at 4.
69. Id. Note, however, that the head of the parliamentary justice committee noted
that prior to amendment, the longest sentence imposed under Article 266b was
60 days.
70. Mary Williams Walsh, Danish Court Allows Neo-Nazi's Extradition to Germany,
L.A. Tnes, Aug. 25, 1996, at A10.
71. Von Ddnemark ausgeliefert Neonazi Lauck jetzt in Hamburg in Haft [Neo-Nazi
Lauck Extradited from Denmark Now in Custody in Hamburg], SUDDE.UTSCEE
ZErruNG, Sept. 7, 1995.
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read to Lauck on September 6, which marked the official beginning of
his custody. Bail was denied, and Lauck was held until the trial be-
gan on May 4, 1996.
Although the beginning of Lauck's trial was covered by more than
fifty reporters, 72 the defendant must have been something of a disap-
pointment. He had grown a toothbrush mustache and styled his hair
in such a way as to resemble the appearance of Adolf Hitler. Lauck
remained impassive throughout the trial, however. It was as if for
Lauck the trial did not take place because he felt that the whole Ger-
man state was illegitimate and had no right to try anyone.73 Only
after his conviction did Lauck recognize the court: he yelled abuse at
those present and shouted that "neither the national socialists nor the
communists dared to kidnap an American citizen."74 As authorities
led him away, Lauck also promised that the struggle would con-
tinue.75 These final outbursts marked the only real spectacle during
Lauck's trial.
During the trial, the prosecution called more than 100 witnesses to
testify against Lauck, who refused to testify on his own behalf.
Lauck's lawyer argued that to find his client guilty, the prosecution
would have to establish that Lauck personally ordered the export of
the prohibited materials.76 Toward the end of the trial, the court
found that six of the counts in the indictment were invalid due to the
passage of the statute of limitations.77 These counts accused Lauck of
distributing a propaganda video titled "The Eternal Jew," which was
an anti-Semitic film made in Nazi Germany. Despite the loss of these
counts, the prosecution demanded the maximum five-year sentence in
its summation. The chief prosecutor emphasized that Lauck had been
importing such materials as the NS-Kampfruf, SS-racial theory,78 and
swastika stickers into Germany for many years.79 According to the
prosecutor, a five-year sentence was the only way to prevent the im-
portation of inflammatory propaganda in the future.80 The defense
72. Haas, supra note 19, at 3.
73. Id.
74. Andrew Grayhamburg, German Court Sentences Lauck to Four Years, JERUSALmi
PosT, Aug. 23, 1996, at 6.
75. Id.
76. Imre Karacs Hamburg, US neo-Nazi Maintains a Silent Defense, INDPENDENT
(LONDON), May 10, 1996, at 13.
77. Sechs Vorwiirfe verjdhrt Gericht ldsst Anklagepunkte gegen Neonazi Lauck fallen
[Six Counts Against Neo-Nazi Lauck Dropped Due to Statute of Limitations],
SMEDDEU'TScHE ZErruNG, Aug. 8, 1996. Offenses in which the maximum punish-
ment is between one and five years imprisonment are limited by a five-year stat-
ute of limitations. § 78 Nr. 3 StGB.
78. Documents prepared by the Schutzstafflen, Hitler's personal police force/army.
79. Pldidoyers im Prozess gegen Gary Lauck in Hamburg, [Closing Arguments in Case
Against Gary Lauck in Hamburg], NEuE ZuocHER ZE NTIrG, Aug. 16, 1996.
80. Id.
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asked for acquittal because everything for which Lauck was accused
was done in the United States, where such propaganda was legal. In
addition, Lauck's attorney argued that his client was illegally extra-
dited from Denmark, as the crimes charged were of a political
nature.8 '
The defense arguments failed to convince the judges, however, and
Lauck was sentenced to four years imprisonment on August 22,
1996.82 He was found guilty of incitement of the people, incitement of
racial hatred, and use of unconstitutional symbols.8 3 The judges ap-
pear to have largely agreed with the prosecution's arguments. In their
sentencing, they called Lauck a fanatic who had run a well-oiled prop-
aganda machine out of the United States for more than twenty years
and whose goal was the resurrection of a national socialist state in
Germany.8 4 The judges noted in their decision that under the Ger-
man Penal Code, an offense is committed in every location in which
any element of the offense is carried out.8 5 In this case, while the NS-
Kampfruf was published in the United States, where it was protected,
it was smuggled into Germany, where it was not protected. Thus, the
elements of the German criminal statute were satisfied.8 6 The court
also disregarded that Lauck may not have personally written some of
the material in NS-Kampfruf because, as the publisher, he accepted
responsibility for the contents of the publication.8 7 In imposing the
four-year sentence, the judges cited as an aggravating factor that
Lauck would resume his work in America after his release from
prison.8 8
HI. LAUCKS EXTRADITION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Lauck's extradition was governed by both customary international
law and multilateral extradition treaties to which both Germany and
Denmark are parties. Denmark and Germany are signatories to the
81. Id. See also infra Part M.
82. Grayhamburg, supra note 74.
83. Fanatsischer Oberzeugungstdter: Vier Jahr Gefdngnis fir Neonazi Lauck [Fa-
natic Political Criminal: Four-Years Imprisonment for Neo-Nazi Lauck], SoD-
DEUTSCHE ZErrUNG, Aug. 23, 1996.
84. Id.
85. "A crime is deemed to have been committed at the place where the perpetrator
acted or at the place where the statutorily proscribed harm occurs or where the
perpetrator intended it to occur." § 9 Nr. 1 StGB (translated by authors). See
generally JOSEPH DARBY, THE PENAL CODE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
mANY (1987).
86. See § 9 Nr. 1 StGB. See also Four-Years Imprisonment, supra note 17.
87. Given the broad interpretation of§ 131 Nr. 1 StGB, the court's decision to hold a
publisher responsible for the contents of the publication seems unsurprising. See
supra note 51.
88. Four-Years Imprisonment, supra note 17.
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European Convention on Extradition (ECE),89 a multilateral extradi-
tion treaty in which signatories are bound to surrender "all persons
against whom the competent authorities are proceeding for an of-
fence," or who are fugitives from a sentence or detention order. 90 The
ECE defines extraditable offenses as those for which the punishment
is serious enough in both the requesting country (Germany) and the
requested country (Denmark) to impose imprisonment for a minimum
of one year.9 1 The distribution of racist propaganda fits the definition
of an extraditable offense under the ECE because the punishment is
up to five years under the German Penal Code92 and up to two years
under Danish law.9 3 The ECE contains two important restrictions on
extradition, however. The first is a requirement of double criminality
under Article 2; the second requirement prohibits extradition for polit-
ical offenses under Article 3. Lauck should not have been extradited if
the charged offenses fell within either of these exceptions.
A. Article 2 of the European Convention on Extradition
The issue of whether Lauck's propaganda violated Danish law is
crucial in determining whether his extradition satisfied the principle
of double criminality. Under customary international law and the
ECE, a crime must be punishable in both the requesting and the re-
quested countries for extradition to be proper.9 4 Thus, if the acts with
which Lauck was charged in Germany did not also constitute a crime
in Denmark, extradition should have been denied. Absolute identity
of elements and nomenclature of the offense is unnecessary. Never-
theless, the act or omission must be punishable in both states.9 5
The Danish Supreme Court concluded that NS-Kampfruf violated
the Danish antiracism law. As discussed, the German Penal Code
prohibits incitement of racial hatred,96 essentially the same offense in
Germany as in Denmark. Since Lauck's published material violated
the laws of both the country making the extradition request (Ger-
many) and the country from which the request was made (Denmark),
the requirements of Article 2 were satisfied.
89. European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 3(2), 359 U.N.T.S. 173,
Europ. T.S. No. 24.
90. Id. art. 1.
91. Id. art. 2.
92. See supra note 46.
93. See supra section ll.D.
94. "Extradition shall be granted in respect of offences punishable under the laws of
the requesting Party and of the requested Party." European Convention on Ex-
tradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 2, § 1, 359 U.N.T.S. 173, Europ. T.S. No. 24 (empha-
sis added).
95. GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAw 120 (1991).
96. § 131 Nr. 1 StGB. See supra note 47.
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B. Article 3 of the European Convention on Extradition
Article 3 provides that "[elxtradition shall not be granted if the of-
fence in respect of which it is requested is regarded by the requested
party as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political
offence."97 The language of Article 3 is mandatory: extradition for a
political offense or for a politically connected offense is a violation of
the ECE. The focus is on the laws of the extraditing country. In this
case, the issue is whether or not Article 266b of the Danish Penal Code
defined a political or a nonpolitical ("common") crime.
Article 3 of the ECE further requires the denial of extradition if the
requested party has a substantial belief that the purpose of the extra-
dition request is to punish a person on account of his race, religion,
nationality, or political opinion.98 Article 3 leaves the definition of
political offense to the requested state, but categorizes several crimes
as not qualifying as political offenses. 99 It is therefore necessary to
refer to the body of customary international law to find a more precise
definition of political crime.
1. Pure Political Offenses
Under customary international law, political crimes are divided
into two categories for the purpose of extradition. The first category,
pure political crimes, is directed against the security and structure of
the state or the regime of official power.iOo Pure political crimes were
defined in In re Giovanni Gatti:io1 "In brief, what distinguishes the
political crime from the common crime102 is the fact that the former
97. European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 3, § 1, 359 U.N.T.S. 173,
Europ. T.S. No. 24.
98. Id. art. 3, § 2.
99. "The taking or attempted taking of the life of a Head of State or a member of his
family" is not a political crime. Id. art. 3. Neither is it a crime against humanity
as specified in the following Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide; Article 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field;
Article 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea; Article
130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
and Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War; or "any comparable violation of the laws of war."
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, Oct. 15, 1975, ch.
1, art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 86. Individuals sought or convicted for violations of
these conventions can be extradited.
100. Michael R. Littenberg, Comment, The Political Offense Exception: An Historical
Analysis and Model for the Future, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (1990).
101. Id. at 1200-01 (discussing, translating, and interpreting In re Giovanni Gatti, S.
Jur. H 44 (Cour d'appel, Grenoble 1947), 14 Ann. Dig. 145 (Ct. App. Grenoble, Fr.
1947)(Fr.).
102. Common crimes are those "acts affecting the life and physical integrity of individ-
uals which [are consistently recognized] in the legal controls of almost all social
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only affects the political organization of the state, the proper rights of
the state, while the latter exclusively affects rights other than those of
the state."' 0 3 A pure political crime is distinctive because it has no
elements of a common crime. Rather, the interest sought to be pro-
tected is the sovereign, the tangible factors of which pertain to the
existence and functioning of the state as an organization.1 0 4 In prac-
tice, pure political crimes have been restricted to treason, espionage,
and sedition.X0 5
Distribution of propaganda of an unconstitutional organization
could fall within the definition of a pure political crime because uncon-
stitutional organizations such as the NSDAP-AO are banned precisely
because they are a threat to the present German government. Distri-
bution of NSDAP-AO propaganda would be sedition, which is a recog-
nized pure political crime. But, whether a crime is of a political
nature is to be measured from the viewpoint of the extraditing coun-
try. In Denmark, the offense of making racist statements is not a pure
political crime.X0 6 In fact, Danish law permits the dissemination of
propaganda of all political parties. Since Denmark allows political
propaganda, Lauck's literature, if punishable under Danish law, must
not be of a political nature. Therefore, the crime would not be a polit-
ical offense within the meaning of the ECE, and the extradition was
proper.
Given the relatively restricted scope of pure political crimes, it ap-
pears proper that the Danish courts found that the distribution of ra-
cist propaganda fell into the category of a common crime. Indeed, the
name of the offense suggests nothing political whatsoever. Article
266b criminalizes the distribution of all racist propaganda, regardless
of motivation. But, it would be unrealistic to view the racial theories
of the Nazi party espoused by Lauck as devoid of political content. A
colorable argument can be made that the distribution of the NS-
Kampfruf, which called for the overthrow of the German government
and the establishment of a national socialist state, is sedition. 0 7 Se-
systems." M. CIHPnF BAssIoumU, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 376 (1974).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 379.
105. Antje C. Petersen, Extradition and the Political Offense Exception in the Suppres-
sion of Terrorism, 67 IND. L.J. 767, 775 (1992).
106. See supra section I.D.
107. In the United States, sedition is defined as follows: "Whoever, with intent to
cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes,
edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or
printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability
or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States
by force or violence, or attempts to do so ... [s]hall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both .... " 18 U.S.CA_. § 2385 (West
1970 & Supp. 1997).
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dition in international law does not require an overt act, but rather a
call for violence,1 0 8 which Lauck's propaganda made. The difference
between sedition and incitement of the people, as charged by the Ger-
man authorities, is one of degree rather than of character. Yet the
Danish courts chose not to characterize Lauck's crimes as purely
political.
2. Relative Political Offenses
A wider variety of offenses is covered by the second category of
political crime-the relative political crime. The relative political
crime is an ideologically motivated common crime that constitutes, at
least in part, a private wrong.' 0 9 In general, three factors are consid-
ered when determining the political character of a common crime: (1)
the degree of political involvement of the actor in the political move-
ment in whose name the common crime was committed; (2) the link
between the common crime and the political objective; and (3) the pro-
portionality of the means to the ends."1o Yet even within customary
international law, the boundaries of relative political crimes are un-
clear, as different countries have given different weight to these fac-
tors."'1 The common factor that has emerged from the various tests is
that the political element must predominate over the intention to com-
mit the common crime. 1 12 If the political element predominates, an
ordinary crime for which extradition is indicated can attain the status
of a political offense. 113 Among European countries, three different
tests have emerged to identify when a common crime has enough
political motivation to be considered a relative political crime.
At its inception, the first test, which evolved in France, looked only
at the rights injured by the common crime. In other words, if the in-
jured rights were those of the state, the common crime was considered
to have a political nature."14 This test has evolved into a balancing of
the degree of the offender's political motivation against the serious-
ness of the common crime. If the common crime has a "rude, wild or
inexcusable nature" that would "shock the universal consciousness,"
the offender may be extradited regardless of the political motivation
behind the crime.115 Even within France, however, some courts have
108. BAssIouNI, supra note 102, at 382.
109. Id. at 383.
110. Id. at 387.
111. Littenberg, supra note 100, at 1204.
112. BAssioum, supra note 102, at 387-88.
113. Petersen, supra note 105, at 775-76.
114. Littenberg, supra note 100, at 1200-01 (discussing and interpreting In re Gio-
vanni Gatti, S. Jur. II 44 (Cour d'appel, Grenoble 1947), 14 Ann Dig. 145 (Ct.
App. Grenoble, Fr. 1947)(Fr.).
115. Id. at 1203-04 (discussing and interpreting In re Pace, judgment of Nov. 7, 1979,
Cour d'appel, Paris T-A-C.P. 367, 375 (Fr)).
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
looked exclusively at the offender's motivation, regardless of the sever-
ity of the crime.116 Nonetheless, all of the French courts have evalu-
ated the rights injured, at least as part of a balancing test, in
determining the political nature of the offense. 117
A second European test is the political-motivation test, developed
by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which is a three-pronged test to deter-
mine whether a common crime is of a political nature. For a common
crime to fall within the political crime exception, it must be (1) politi-
cally motivated; (2) proportional to the political objective sought; and
(3) incidental to a struggle for political power."s A Swiss court has
held that under this test, a crime has a predominantly political char-
acter when the criminal action is immediately connected with its polit-
ical objective."1 9 The proportionality of the severity of the crime to the
objective sought is measured from an objective viewpoint.120 The
Swiss test is restrictive in the temporal sense of requiring an ongoing
struggle for power as well as a direct connection between the common
crime and the political object.121
In England, yet another method of evaluating the relative political
nature of a crime has evolved-the political incidence test. The origi-
nal formulation of this test was quite restrictive as set forth in In re
Castioni.122 The Castioni court held that for a crime to be political, it
had to be an overt act in a political matter, in a political uprising, or a
dispute between two parties in a state that has the government in its
hands.123 This test essentially restricted political crimes to those
committed during civil war or rebellion and made many common
crimes committed during the course of such struggles into relative
political crimes. This definition of relative political crime has been
held to preclude the use of the political exception defense to the extra-
dition of an anarchist who, by definition, was not fighting for the re-
placement of one form of government for another, but for the abolition
of government itself.124 While the English rule is expansive in that it
does not look at the severity of the crime, 125 it is restrictive in a tem-
poral sense because for a common crime to have a political nature, the
116. Id. at 1205.
117. GILBERT, supra note 95, at 127.
118. Littenberg, supra note 100, at 1206.
119. See BAssiouNI, supra note 102, at 376-88 (discussing In re Paran, 1923 Ann. Dig.
247 (No. 239)(Switz.)).
120. Id.
121. GILBERT, supra note 95, at 128.
122. 1 Q.B. 149 (1891)(Eng.).
123. Id. at 156.
124. See In re Meunier, 2 Q.B. 415 (1894)(Eng.).
125. Littenberg, supra note 100, at 1211.
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act must be proximate in time to the final goal of the dissenting
party.126
Since the United States does not recognize a customary interna-
tional law of extradition,127 the extradition determination depends on
the language of the applicable treaty.128 Yet, because most treaties
prohibit extradition for political offense without defining the term ex-
plicitly, American courts must apply some test to determine the polit-
ical nature of a crime. The United States Supreme Court has adopted
the Castioni test from England. The Supreme Court has also affirmed
the position that relative political offenses are not extraditable, and
the test to be applied is one of "political motivation."'12 9 Despite the
name of the test, it is most similar to the English test.130
Given the diversity of these tests, an analysis of the political na-
ture of Lauck's action is simplified by examining the three factors sug-
gested by Professor Bassiouni' 3 ' as common to the European tests.
The first factor, the degree of involvement, is entirely subjective.132 In
context, one can infer the depth of Lauck's involvement in the political
cause from his role with the NSDAP-AO as its founder and leader. If
the political cause to be evaluated is the national-socialist movement
as a whole, it is clear that the NSDAP-AO was an important element
in the movement both as a propaganda supplier and as an intelligence
coordinator. Lauck's great commitment to the "cause," while subjec-
tive, is quite apparent from his twenty-five year involvement in the
Nazi movement.' 3 3 The depth of Lauck's involvement in NSDAP-AO
activities is prone to lend the crimes he committed on behalf of the
movement to a political motivation and therefore to make them rela-
tive political offenses.134
The second factor to be evaluated is the existence of a link between
the common crime and the political goal. This element is at least
somewhat objective in that it looks at the existence of a link rather
than the strength of the link.135 The stated political objective of the
NSDAP-AO was the overthrow of the German government and the es-
126. GILBERT, supra note 95, at 121.
127. See 6 MARIom M. WHITEBAL, DIGEST OF INTEmRNATIoNAL LAW 732-37 (1968).
128. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). See also Jacques Sem-
melman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal Courts: Making Sense of United
States v. Rauscher, 34 V-. J. INT'L L. 71 (1993).
129. Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959), affd, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
130. See BAssIoumI, supra note 102, at 388-90.
131. Professor Gilbert suggests that the Swiss model is the most appropriate test of
the models discussed above. Its elements are essentially the same as those sug-
gested by Professor Bassiouni. See GILBERT, supra note 95, at 130.
132. BAssIouNi, supra note 102, at 387.
133. See supra Part II.
134. See supra Part 11 and subsection MI.B.2.
135. BAssioum, supra note 102, at 387.
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tablishment of a national socialist state in Germany.' 36 Certainly,
one of the means of achieving this goal is through propaganda to incite
the people against its government.' 37 The existence of a link between
the common crime and the political goal can be seen in the distribu-
tion of propaganda promoting the party's racial and political theories,
propaganda that is connected to the final goals of the NSDAP-AO.
Lauck's crime of publishing the NS-Kampfruf also satisfies this second
factor.
The final factor common to the European tests is proportionality of
the crimes to the political ends. In this case, Lauck was charged with
crimes that could lead to imprisonment of up to two years in Den-
mark 38 or five years in Germany,' 3 9 which is equivalent to felony
sentences in the United States. Although the final goal of the NSDAP-
AO involved the violent overthrow of the German government, the
publication of NS-Kampfruf alone was not a violent act. The over-
throw of a government is often a traumatic change to a country's social
order and frequently involves quite extreme measures. With that
backdrop, the publication of inflammatory propaganda, even though
filled with racism and calls to violence, seems comparatively mild.
Without excusing its content, the relatively minor nature of the com-
mon crime of distributing racist propaganda in comparison to the final
goals of the political organization seem to further Lauck's claim that
his crime was a political offense.
This analysis depends on the precise actus reus of Lauck's crime.
The Danish courts considered the actus reus to be dissemination of the
NS-Kampfruf. The only violation of Danish law was distribution of
racially inflammatory propaganda.' 40 Yet, in Germany, distribution
of NS-Kampfruf, the same single act, constituted a violation of several
provisions of the German Penal Code.'4' NS-Kampfruf is the propa-
ganda of an unconstitutional organization;' 42 it is adorned with the
symbols of an unconstitutional organization;' 43 it incites the peo-
ple;' 44 and it incites people to racial hatred.' 45 All of these offenses
could be considered to be included offenses within the act of publica-
tion, which was punishable under Danish law.146 Lauck's motivation
136. See supra Part II.
137. Indeed, one of the means by which the Nazi government originally obtained
power in Germany was through the use of racially and politically inflammatory
propaganda.
138. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 45-49.
140. See supra sections 1.C and I.D.
141. See supra Part I and section I.B.
142. § 86 Nr. 1 StGB.
143. § 86a Nr. 2 StGB.
144. § 130 Nr. 1 StGB.
145. § 131 Nr. 1 StGB.
146. See supra Part I.
[Vol. 76:653
EXTRADITION OF NEO-NAZI LEADER
was unclear-NS-Kampfruf calls for the establishment of a national
socialist state in Germany and denigrates Jews and other racial mi-
norities. The dual nature of Lauck's propaganda leads to the question
of whether the trial was proper under the doctrine of specialty. Under
this doctrine, Lauck should not have been tried for all these offenses,
even if they could be considered part of the actus reus for which Lauck
was extradited.
C. Speciality
Specialty requires that a person be tried only for the crimes for
which he has been extradited.147 The doctrine is designed to protect
the rights of the requested state rather than the individual defend-
ant:' 48 if an extradited person is prosecuted for other crimes, the re-
quested state will have had neither the opportunity to evaluate the
political nature of the new charges nor the opportunity to establish
that the same activity is deemed criminal in the requesting state.1 49
Although the doctrine of specialty usually is explicit in extradition
treaties, the United States Supreme Court has recognized specialty as
a principle of customary international law. 5 0
Under the doctrine of specialty, the person extradited can be tried
for any offense committed in the requesting country as established by
the facts supporting the original request, provided that it is a kindred
offense based on the same facts. The kindred offense must also be an
extraditable offense and satisfy the requirement of double criminality.
The prosecution of Lauck for crimes other than making racists
statements, as embodied in the German Penal Code,l51 violates the
doctrine of specialty. The charge of using a symbol of an unconstitu-
tional organization, for example, could not have been charged in Den-
mark. The use of the swastika is not prohibited under Danish law,
and if that was the only charge against Lauck, he could not have been
extradited for trial without violating the principle of double criminal-
ity. The same analysis applies to Lauck's membership in an unconsti-
tutional organization: since the NSDAP-AO is not banned in
Denmark, Lauck should not have been tried in Germany for his
147. RESTATEMiENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIoNs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 477 (1987). 'Under most international agreements, state laws and state prac-
tice: (1) A person who has been extradited to another state will not, unless the
requested state consents, (a) be tried by the requesting state for an offense other
than the one for which he was extradited...." Id.
148. Kenneth E. Levitt, Note, International Extradition, the Principle of Specialty,
and Effective Treaty Enforcement, 76 MmN. L. REv. 1017, 1025 (1992)(footnote
omitted).
149. For the requirement of double criminality under the ECE, see supra subsection
III.B.1.
150. See Levitt, supra note 148.
151. § 131 Nr. 1 StGB. See supra note 46.
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NSDAP-AO membership. Although Lauck was charged with thirty-
six counts under five charges, he was extradited from Denmark for
one violation of the Danish Criminal Code. The only correlative Ger-
man law is the provision in the German Penal Code prohibiting the
dissemination of materials that incite people to racial hatred.152
Thus, Lauck should have been tried only for violations of this section.
Had the German courts properly applied the doctrine of specialty,
Lauck still could have received the same prison term for his convic-
tion. The maximum sentence under the German Penal Code is five
years imprisonment, 153 more than Lauck ultimately received. It is a
matter of conjecture whether the judges would have imposed such a
stiff sentence had Lauck not been convicted of so many offenses.
Given the judges' remarks at sentencing, it seems unlikely that the
sentence would have changed because the judges believed that Lauck
would return to publishing NS-Kampfruf upon his release. 154 Thus,
compliance with the doctrine of specialty would not have necessitated
a less severe sentence for Lauck.
As a practical matter, a person who has been prosecuted for of-
fenses outside those prescribed by the doctrine of specialty has little
recourse within the doctrine. At the time the doctrine is violated, he
already is in the state committing the violation of specialty and is re-
stricted by the availability of remedies in that country. The prisoner
might file a petition with an international court of appeals for an ex-
tranational review of the decision, but the process is complex and
time-consuming.155 The requested state has the option of refusing fu-
ture extradition requests to states that violate the doctrine of spe-
cialty and can thus protect its right. American courts are split as to
whether or not a defendant has standing to raise the defense of spe-
cialty when the extraditing state does not raise the issue.156 But in-
voking the doctrine of specialty probably offers the individual
defendant little relief.
152. § 131 Nr. 1 StGB. See supra note 46.
153. § 131 Nr. 1 StGB. See supra note 46.
154. See supra section U.E.
155. The right of the individual, as opposed to the state, to appeal to an international
court is extremely restricted. See CHmSTInE D. GRAY, JUDICiLAL REMEDIES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw (1987).
156. See United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986)(stating that the
extradited person may raise whatever objections the rendering country might
have), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986). But see Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of
United States, 462 F.2d 475, 482 (2d Cir. 1972)(holding that the defendant
therein could not raise the defense as a bar to prosecution absent a protest by the
surrendering country), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
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D. Political Asylum
Having lost his appeals through the Danish court system, Lauck
made a final attempt to avoid transport to Germany. In a last ditch
effort to prevent his extradition, Lauck asked the Danish Immigration
Board for political asylum, a request that was quickly denied.157 The
question of whether or not to grant political asylum is an issue of do-
mestic law rather than international treaty. On the other hand, the
question of whether to grant humanitarian asylum is one of custom-
ary international law.158 Here, Lauck's crimes were related to reli-
gion and thus fell under the purview of international law as
humanitarian asylum.' 59 While no country is required to grant asy-
lum, several United Nations treaties prohibit the transfer of refugees
to countries in which they face prosecution. The Prohibition of Expul-
sion or Return (Refoulement)'60 provides the following:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontier of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account on his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee [for] whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to
the security of the country, in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the com-
munity of that country.161
This prohibition, however, is restricted to refugees. The term refugee
is defined as "any person who ... owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of... political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear.., is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country.... ." 6 2 Lauck clearly
did not qualify for refugee status because he voluntarily had left the
United States, not because he feared prosecution in the United States.
Thus, the Danish Immigration Board's denial of Lauck's petition for
political asylum did not contravene customary international law.
E. Political Aspects
The decision to extradite Gary Lauck clearly contained a domestic
and international political dynamic. Denmark officials admitted that
they did not want Denmark to become a European center for Neo-Na-
zis. The Danish Parliament had recently strengthened antiracist
157. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
158. BAssIouNI, supra note 102, at 107, 109.
159. Id. at 107.
160. Prohibition of Expulsion or Return (Refoulement), Jan. 31, 1967, art. 33, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
161. Id.
162. Draft Convention related to the Status of Refugees, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 5th
Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 48, U.N. Doc. A11775 (1950).
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speech law, and the Lauck extradition decision offered the courts an
opportunity to show their support for the law as amended.
During Lauck's detention, neo-Nazi groups in Germany had de-
manded his release and clashed violently with counterdemonstrators
on the anniversary of Rudolf Hess' death.163 Denmark had faced in-
ternational pressure for its decision not to extradite Nazis in the past.
Much of that pressure came from Germany, one of Denmark's largest
trading partners, and Denmark undoubtedly would have faced re-
newed anger had it refused to extradite Lauck. Although the Danish
courts' decision had some legal justification under the ECE and cus-
tomary international law, it obviously was influenced by the opinion of
Danish citizens and other members of the international community.
IV. AFTERMATH
Although Gary Lauck was sentenced to four years in prison, under
German law, the time he spent in investigatory custody will be de-
ducted from his sentence. As a result, he will be released in Septem-
ber 1999, if not earlier. Since Lauck's arrest, NS-Kampfruf has
appeared sporadically rather than on a bimonthly basis.164 In this
respect, the BKA and BfV have met their goals of slowing the influx of
paper propaganda. German police officials, however, realize that the
flow of Nazi propaganda has not stopped entirely. In the United
States, the NSDAP-AO continues to support an Internet homepage, 165
through which anyone can order NS-Kampfruf or other materials
banned in Germany.
Cases like Lauck's may be the last of its kind in the sense that
"paper" propaganda is becoming obsolete due to advances in informa-
tion technology. Lauck's prosecutor admitted that the spread of this
material through the Internet cannot be curbed due to technical and
legal limitations.166 According to the Bavarian state police, right-
wing extremists have taken far greater advantage of the Internet to
spread their ideologies than left-wing supporters. This has caused
some police investigators to completely change their duties, spending
an increasingly large amount of time on the Internet looking for illegal
propaganda.167 German officials face a number of obstacles when at-
163. Aus Anlass des Todetages von Rudolf Hess Zusammenstoesse mit Neonazis [Clash
with Neo-Nazis on Anniversary of the Death of Rudolf Hess], SUDDEUTSCH
ZErruNG, Aug. 21, 1995.
164. Toni Heinzl, Lauck Gets Prison Term In Germany, OmAHA WORLD HERALD, Aug.
23, 1996, at 1.
165. Skin-Net (shane), The New Order (visited Sept. 14, 1997) <http//ftcnet.com/
skinhds/neworder/index.htm>.
166. Elizabeth Neuffer, German Court Convicts U.S. Nazi Publisher: Farmbelt Fiihrer
gets 4-year term, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 1996, at A2.
167. Haas & Lebert, supra note 29.
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tempting to prosecute a person who posts admittedly illegal propa-
ganda to a web page abroad. How the information was made available
within Germany is the relevant question under German law. As the
Lauck case indicates, German laws were written to cast a very broad
net in terms of punishing the dissemination of Nazi propaganda. Yet
in Lauck's case, the German court recognized that the offender must
have committed illegal acts in Germany before the offender may be
subjected to prosecution in Germany. In an electronic information
transfer case, the words and images of the illegal propaganda them-
selves are physically stored in a computer on foreign soil. As a result,
German authorities have responded by acting against the people and
firms that make access to the Internet possible, even though it is the
computer's user, rather than the service providers, who decide which
pages are viewed.168
In 1995, the state police in Mannheim investigated two Internet
service providers for abetting incitement of the people by allowing
electronic access to Nazi propaganda.' 6 9 Perhaps technological inno-
vations will enable service providers to block web pages that contain
illegal propaganda or symbols. At present, so long as people in Ger-
many have access to computer networks, they will have access to for-
bidden propaganda.
The difficulty of denying electronic access to Nazi propaganda in
Germany is analogous to the problems posed by access to pornography
on the Internet in the United States. In an attempt to prevent minors
from gaining access to obscene material, Congress enacted the Com-
munications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).170 The CDA adds language
to the Telecommunications Act that criminalizes the use of any inter-
active computer service to display to a person under eighteen years of
age, "in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary com-
munity standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless
of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the com-
munication."'17 Internet access providers are exempted,172 as are
services that take good faith, reasonable, and appropriate actions to
prevent access by minors. 173 Yet the CDA does not define what is of-
fensive and turns to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Miller v. California'74 for a definition of obscenity.175 Although the
168. Kurt Kister, Handel mit NS-Propaganda-von der Verfassung geschiitzt [Neo-Nazi
Propoganda Trade Protected by the Constitution], SODDEtuSCHE ZErrUNG, Jan.
27, 1996.
169. Id.
170. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133 (Feb. 8, 1996).
171. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B) (1997).
172. Id. § 223(e)(1).
173. Id. § 223(e)(5).
174. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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CDA represents an early attempt at controlling information on the In-
ternet, its effectiveness remains to be determined.
V. FINAL THOUGHTS
As Lauck's attorney noted, "the interesting thing about this trial is
that it illuminates the relativity of civil rights."176 The case also illus-
trates that the protections offered by the United States Constitution
effectively end at the nation's borders. Although Gary Lauck's com-
ments after his conviction indicate that he believed the United States
Constitution would protect Americans while abroad, his faith was mis-
placed. As this case demonstrates, the concept of civil rights and free-
dom of speech truly are relative to the nation's historical and cultural
background. The American world traveler is well-advised to know the
laws of his destination, for his substantive rights abroad will be deter-
mined by local law rather than the broad protections offered by the
United States Constitution.
175. The Miller test defines a three-prong test to determine whether material is
obscene:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
176. Rick Atkinson, Germany Set to Try U.S. White Supremacist, WAsH. POST, May 9,
1996, at A36.
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